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Law 
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Abstract 
This paper considers the definitions of spouse, civil partner and partner in European Union 
free movement of persons law in order to question the EU’s heterocentric approach to 
defining ‘family’ in this context. It argues that the terms ‘spouse’ should include same sex 
married partners to ensure there is no discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. It 
further highlights the problems created by basing free movement rights of civil partners on 
host state recognition of such partnerships. This approach allows Member States to 
discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation and is therefore not compatible with EU 
equality law in others areas. The position of unmarried or unregistered partners is also 
considered. In particular the paper examines the requirement of a duly attested durable 
relationship and its impact on same-sex partners wishing to move from one Member State to 
another. The paper argues that it is time to reconsider the law in this area and bring it in line 
with the EU’s commitment to eliminate discrimination on several grounds including sexual 
orientation. 
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Introduction 
European Union citizens can take advantage of a number of rights when migrating from their 
home Member State to a host state in the European Union (EU). Many of these rights are 
extended to family members of those citizens. Being able to show that one is a family 
member of an EU citizen and, in particular, an economically active EU citizen is thus 
important when trying to access rights linked to migration. This is even more so the case 
where the family member in question is a  third country national who cannot take advantage 
of EU citizenship and associated benefits in their own right.  
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This paper considers how family is conceptualised in EU law with a particular focus on 
spouses and partners. It examines the scope of the terms ‘spouse’ and ‘partner’ and in doing 
so pays specific attention to the extent to which the legal provisions might negatively impact 
on same-sex couples. This paper begins by examining the definitions applied to couples 
under the terms of Directive 2004/38, the Citizens’ Rights Directive, before moving on to 
examine the importance of developing clear and non-discriminatory definitions of family in 
EU law in this context.  
 
Defining Family in EU Law 
The EU does not have any express or explicit competence over family law matters. 
Nevertheless, certain provisions of EU law – free movement being a prime example – have 
clearly impacted on family-type issues (Bell 2004, Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot 2004). 
EU involvement tends to arise where it is required, for some reason, to define the notion of 
family. The EU had to consider who would constitute a ‘family’ member from the inception 
of the internal market. Free movement and associated rights were extended to workers’ 
families initially by Regulation 1612/68 which afforded rights to the EU worker’s spouse and 
their descendants who were under the age of 21 years or dependants; and ‘dependent relatives 
in the ascending line of the worker and his spouse’ (Article 10(1) (a) and (b)). More limited 
rights were granted to ‘any member of the family not coming within the provisions of 
paragraph 1 if dependent on the worker referred to above or living under his roof in the 
country whence he comes’ (Regulation 1612/68 Article 10(2)).  The EU thus initially only 
granted rights to the EU worker and some limited family members rather than the worker’s 
family in a broader sense. These provisions have now been replaced by the definitions in 
Directive 2004/38, the Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD). The CRD sets out the legal 
framework governing ‘the right of citizens of the Union and their family members (my 
emphasis) to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. The 
definition of EU citizen in this context is straight forward and simply refers to a national of 
any Member State (Article 2(1) CRD). The definition of family member however necessitates 
further consideration. Article 2(2) CRD sets out the family members to whom the rights laid 
down in the Directive apply. The EU family here includes the spouse and civil partner if civil 
partnerships are treated as equivalent to marriage in the host state, and each of these 
categories will be considered in turn in order to highlight differences in the granting of rights 
to different categories of partners.
i
  
Spouses 
The term ‘spouse’ refers to a married partner. In most Member States this is assumed to refer 
to husband and wife, in other words a heterosexual partnership (European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2010). The possibility of decoupling the term spouse from marriage has 
been the subject of policy and judicial consideration (Bell 2004, D’Oliviera 2000). For 
example, in Netherlands v Reed the ECJ considered a claim brought by a heterosexual 
unmarried couple for equal treatment with a married couple. The ECJ declined to extend the 
scope of the term ‘spouse’ to include partners in a long term relationship who were not 
married. It concluded: 
 ‘In the absence of any indication of a general social development which would justify a 
broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the regulation, it 
must be held that the term 'spouse' in Article 10 of the Regulation refers to a marital 
relationship only’. 
 
 It is clear then, that ‘spouse’ cannot be interpreted to include cohabitees or long term 
partners. Interestingly the ECJ did acknowledge that this area of law is susceptible to 
changing social attitudes. Given that the provisions in the Regulation would affect all 
Member States and there was no consensus across Member States on whether or not long 
term partners should have equal rights with married partners, the ECJ did not consider it 
appropriate to intervene and interpret ‘spouse’ broadly.  
 
 If ‘spouse’ refers to ‘marital relationships only’ (Netherlands v Reed), the question of 
whether the term includes same-sex couples who have entered into a civil partnership or 
similar registered union arises.  The answer here appears to be ‘no’. The ECJ considered the 
position of same-sex registered partners in D and Sweden v Council. The issue here was the 
granting of certain benefits to spouses which were not granted to civil partners. The ECJ held 
that this was lawful as the difference arose not from the difference in sexual orientation of the 
parties concerned but from the differing legal status between marriage and civil partnership.  
The ECJ stated that it was accepted that ‘the term marriage means a union between two 
persons of the opposite sex’ (at paragraph 34). It also recognised that an increasing number of 
states have provided for legal recognition of same-sex partnerships (at paragraph 35). The 
ECJ then commented:  
It is clear, however, that apart from their great diversity, such arrangements for registering 
relationships between couples not previously recognised in law are regarded in the 
Member States concerned as being distinct from marriage. (Paragraph 36). 
And crucially: 
In such circumstances the Community judicature cannot interpret the Staff Regulations in 
such a way that legal situations distinct from marriage are treated in the same way as 
marriage. (Paragraph 37) 
The ECJ further considered whether or not the difference in treatment here amounted to 
discrimination. In making its assessment it considered that the ‘principle of equal treatment 
can apply only to persons in comparable situations’ (D and Sweden v Council, Paragraph 48). 
The court recognised, as it has done in Reed in relation to cohabitees, that there was no 
consensus amongst Member States. It therefore concluded that   
‘In those circumstances, the situation of an official who has registered a partnership in 
Sweden cannot be held to be comparable, for the purposes of applying the Staff 
Regulations, to that of a married official’.(paragraph 51) 
It is difficult to see how the Judgment can be construed as anything other than discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation.  Certainly, given that in the majority of countries where 
civil partnerships are recognised, only same-sex couples can enter into them and marriage is 
still restricted to heterosexual couples in all but 5 Member States it is hard to see how treating 
marriage and civil partnership differently is anything other than discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation.
ii
  
 
However, the ruling in D and Sweden was concerned with civil partners as opposed to 
married partners. It does therefore leave the door open for the term spouse as set out in the 
CRD to include same-sex married partners. There seems no logical reason to exclude them as 
indeed there is no difference in status between them and a heterosexual couple who have 
married in the same jurisdiction. Whether or not the term ‘spouse’ also includes same-sex 
spouses was subject to debate in the run up to the enactment of the CRD (Bell 2004). The 
version which was enacted in 2004 simply refers to spouse but, as with similar phrasing in 
human rights jurisprudence, is assumed to refer to heterosexual spouses (Tobin 2009). In fact 
the European Parliament argued for the inclusion of a reference to spouse of either sex into 
the directive, thus explicitly recognising same-sex marriage (European Parliament 2003, Bell 
2004). However this amendment was rejected on the basis that there is no Member State 
consensus on same-sex marriage or even civil partnership status. The Commission explained 
the rejection of the amendment as follows: 
The Court has also ruled that an interpretation of legal terms on the basis of social 
developments that has effects in all the Member States must take into account the situation 
in the whole Community [original footnote omitted]. The Commission therefore prefers to 
restrict the proposal to the concept of spouse as meaning in principle spouse of a different 
sex, unless there are subsequent developments. 
 What this does suggest is that at some point in the future, when the recognition of same-sex 
marriage is more widespread, the EU is likely to recognise the inclusion of same-sex married 
partners within the term spouse. In fact the 2008 report on the implementation of the CRD 
(European Commission 2008) noted that not doing so would be direct discrimination in 
breach of the general principle of equality and the requirement not to discriminate as set out 
in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The report urged Member States to 
recognise same-sex spouses but no concrete move has been made to amend the CRD to 
reflect that (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, Tobin 2010).  Until that 
happens, it seems, same-sex spouses will remain not really spouses at all. 
 
Civil Partners 
Civil partners are recognised in EU Law if the host state recognises civil partnerships as 
being equivalent to marriage. However, the question of what is required for a civil 
partnership to be equivalent to marriage is not clearly defined. If, for example, equivalence 
means that the civil partnership must offer the same rights and responsibilities as marriage, 
there will be no such unions which meet that standard. Civil partnerships, while in some 
cases offering almost identical rights to marriage, often have different provisions in relation 
to, for example, parental responsibility, succession issues or adoption. In some cases there are 
further differences relating to, for example, questions of tax which in reality mean that civil 
partnerships differ significantly from marriage (ILGA Europe 2010). If taken in this sense, 
one might argue that when referring to civil partnerships with marriage equivalent status, the 
CRD is actually referring to same-sex marriage in which case this provision would be 
applicable in only 5 Member States. However, it seems unlikely that this narrow 
interpretation was intended, given that the provision does refer specifically to civil 
partnerships rather than same-sex marriage. A broader notion of equivalence is therefore 
required. This might be based on establishing equivalence in relation to immigration rules. 
So, if national rules treat civil partners in the same way as heterosexual spouses then 
equivalence for the purposes of the CRD is established. This analysis is also unsatisfactory as 
it would mean that EU rules would add nothing and would be dependent on states 
recognising immigration rights first. A more holistic and perhaps common sense approach is 
to accept that there are likely to be differences in rights between civil partners and 
heterosexual spouses because they are ultimately different legal statuses. Rather than looking 
for identical rights and responsibilities and focusing on differences between the two statuses, 
the focus should be on the similarities and the question of whether in law they are broadly 
equivalent even if there may be some differences in the detail. Viewing equivalence in this 
way would bring the 13 Member States recognising civil partnerships within the scope of the 
CRD.
iii
 If those states allowing same-sex marriage were also included within this provision a 
total of 18 states would provide recognition of same-sex relationships (ILGA Europe 2010, 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights) and thus allow couples to derive 
rights as family members of EU citizens. 
 
However, whether or not rights can be derived on that basis is explicitly made dependant on 
host state recognition (CRD Article 2(2) (b)). While the policy rationale for this is perhaps 
clear; the EU shied away from interfering with the organisation of family law and telling 
states that they must accept same-sex partnerships in some official capacity, the provisions 
makes no logical sense if traditional free movement rationales are applied. If the aim is the 
encouragement of free movement amongst economically active citizens and we recognise 
that they are likely to want to be able to move with their families and perhaps partners in 
particular, making the rights of civil partners dependant on host state recognition is a 
backward step. Why would an EU national whose partnership is recognised in the home 
country choose to move to another Member State where their relationship is not recognised?  
This point was argued in D and Sweden but was held to be inadmissible because it was not 
argued at first instance and only introduced on appeal. We therefore do not have the benefit 
of the ECJ’s opinion on this matter.  Furthermore the Commission, in the process of enacting 
the CRD, expressed concern about reverse discrimination, that is the idea that EU migrants 
have more advantageous rights in the host country than nationals of that state: 
‘To confer rights which are not recognised in the case of its own nationals on couples from 
other Member States could in fact create reverse discrimination, which the Commission 
would prefer to avoid’.(European Commission 2003, p 11) 
The Commission does not, however, seem too concerned with avoiding discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation in this context which sits uneasily with its commitment to 
eliminating such discrimination more generally. In addition, Case C-25/02 Rinke v 
Ärztekammer Hamburg suggests that where Union instruments fall foul of equal treatment 
law, their legality can be questioned: the ECJ concluded ‘that compliance with the prohibition 
of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex is a condition governing the legality of all 
measures adopted by the Community institutions’ (Rinke at paragraph 28). Given the EU’s 
clear stance on the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in other 
areas it is difficult to see how it can justify its definition of family in relation to civil partners 
in this context. 
 By prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in employment the EU is 
already influencing the way Member States have to conceptualise family at least in terms of 
how that relates to employment related issues. Is it really a step too far to ask the EU to 
compel Member States to recognise civil partnerships lawfully entered into in another 
Member State within their territory for the purposes of the rights enshrined in the CRD? The 
rights are after all mostly related to immigration rules and access to employment and not with 
matters which will fundamentally impact on national family law systems, which is where the 
EU’s concern seems to lie. Very recently, in Case C-34/0 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national 
de l'emploi (ONEm), the ECJ showed its willingness to interfere in domestic systems relating 
to residence of third country nationals deriving rights from non mobile EU citizens. It is 
argued that those couples who have lawfully entered into a civil partnership in one Member 
State and then move to another Member State have an equally strong claim to fall within the 
scope of EU law. In their case there is a much clearer EU dimension to which attach their 
claim whereas in Zambrano no intra-EU mobility had taken place.  Furthermore, free 
movement of persons jurisprudence confirms that the free movement provisions must be 
interpreted broadly (Case 291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v R. N. G. 
Eind) and that Member States must be prevented from ‘eliminat[ing] at will the protection 
afforded by the Treaty’. (Case 75/63 Hoekstra v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel en Ambachten at paragraph 1). On that basis, civil partnerships should be 
recognised by a host state where lawfully entered into in another Member State; it is difficult 
to see how doing so is anything other than discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. Allowing and indeed facilitating such discrimination seems contrary to EU 
intentions and thus undermines its work in other areas. As well as being of real practical 
importance to those civil partners considering moving between Member States, this issue 
may also be of great symbolic significance because the EU could have chosen to send a clear 
signal that marriage is not the gold standard (Frimston 2006) and civil partnerships are not a 
consolation prize in EU law. As things stand, civil partners are only civil partners in EU law 
if the chosen host state recognises them as such. 
  
Partners 
So far this paper has considered the position of spouses and civil partners. The limitations of 
the provisions, especially for same-sex couples have been acknowledged but at least there are 
provisions in place which allow for further interpretation and development through the case 
law of the ECJ as well as forming the basis of debate and future reform. The provisions do 
not however adequately capture the situation of the significant proportion of couples, whether 
same-sex or heterosexual, who choose not to get married or enter into civil partnerships. 
Article 2 CRD does not recognise unmarried or unregistered partners as family who have 
access to the rights enshrined in the Directive. 
 
Instead Article 3 CRD confers more limited rights on other dependant family members or 
those needing personal care as well as on members of the citizen’s household and partners 
with whom the citizen has a durable relationship.  The focus here is on the latter group. To 
fall within this definition of partner there has to be a ‘durable relationship’ which is ‘duly 
attested’. The first question arising is what might constitute a durable relationship. Little 
guidance is provided at EU level. The European Commission’s guidance on the transposition 
of The CRD states that the Directive applies to ‘a de facto durable relationship, duly attested’, 
this requirement must be assessed taking into account the Directive’s aim ‘to maintain the 
unity of the family in a broad sense (European Commission 2009; 5). The guidance further 
suggests that documentary evidence that the relationship is durable can be required by the 
host state but gives no guidance on what sort of evidence that might be. The UK Border 
Agency (2009), for example, has the following advice: 
‘You would generally need to show us that you have been in a subsisting relationship for 
two years or more. This could be through joint bank or building society statements, joint 
tenancy agreements, council tax bills or evidence that you are both paying utility bills at 
the property at which you reside’. 
A durable relationship thus appears to be one that is of at least 2 year duration although less 
time together may give rise to rights where the durability of a shorter relationship can be 
‘duly attested’ (see below).  This in itself is perhaps not particularly controversial as it is not 
difficult to understand a policy rationale which stops those partners who are in new 
relationships, which may or may not turn out to be stable and long lasting, to derive 
immigration rights. The possibilities of abuse of such rights are arguably too great.  
 
The ‘duly attested’ requirement is much more difficult. The requirement for documentary 
evidence may cause problems for some couples: for example a couple who have been in a 
relationship for a number of years but because of personal choice, or perhaps work 
commitments, have chosen not to live together. They do not share bank accounts or pay joint 
bills. They spend some time at each others’ places of residence and go on holiday together. Is 
this sufficient proof that they are in fact in a durable relationship? It seems that authorities 
might well presume that durability does not relate to time in a relationship but time living 
together and that without proof of living together, couples will struggle to convince the 
authorities that their relationship is in fact durable (European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights 2010). This may be particularly problematic for younger couples who have not yet 
been able to move in together but intend to do so or perhaps for couples later in their life-
course after a previous relationship has broken down.  They may well be moving to another 
Member State precisely to start a new part of their lives together and proving that their 
relationship is durable may be tricky given the criteria set out above. 
In addition, the criteria may be particularly difficult for some same-sex couples to fulfil. If, 
for example, they are moving from a Member State where there is no, or limited recognition 
of their relationship, or where they would face persecution if they were open about their 
relationship, they might struggle to meet the criteria. Couples moving to another Member 
State because of greater equality in the chosen host state may struggle to prove their 
relationship exists at all, never mind that it is durable. 
 
Whereas in considerations of spousal and civil partner rights one might argue that the 
solution is to simply place them on an equal footing and thus avoid discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, this argument does not apply to unmarried couples. The 
provision in Article 3 CRD is gender neutral and could apply to partners of same or different 
sex. The potential for discrimination here relates to how national authorities interpret 
durability and the required proof (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010). 
Further research in this area is required to shed light on what states expect and the extent to 
which there is a risk of indirect discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. As the 
provisions currently stand partners in EU law are partners but that does not mean they are 
able to access EU law rights. 
 
Why does any of this matter? 
Inevitably the question of why any of this matters arises when examining an area of law 
which might at first appear to be of significance only to a minority of EU citizens. However, 
it is argued that the issues raised in this paper so far are important for three principal reasons. 
First they are important because EU citizens and their partners or spouses can derive 
important rights from the CRD if they can bring themselves within the relevant definitions; 
secondly the issues raised are important because they highlight tensions between EU policy 
and law relating to  rights as contained in the CRD and other EU policy areas and legislation 
which are concerned with eliminating discrimination; and finally the issues raised are 
important because of the symbolic message they convey. In the following section each of 
these contentions will be examined further. 
 
The Practical importance 
Those bringing themselves within the definition of family as defined in Article 2(2) CRD 
benefit from all the rights contained in the Directive. In other words they will have the right 
to enter and reside in the host state as well as access to the labour market regardless of their 
nationality. The rights are potentially important for EU spouses and relevant civil partners. 
While they will have an initial three months right to residence as well as the right to access to 
the labour market because of their own EU citizenship status, if they are unable to find work 
or do not wish to be economically active, they will need to derive rights of residence and 
access to social advantages from the economically active EU citizen they have moved with. 
The provisions are of course of greater importance to those family members who are not 
themselves EU nationals as they cannot rely on their own status for rights.  
 
Many Member States have strict immigration rules which make it difficult to bring third-
country national family members into that state. EU citizens can therefore be at an advantage 
over nationals who have not exercised their free movement rights but wish to bring non EU 
nationals to live with them in a Member State. Once matters come within the scope of EU 
law, the parties can rely on the Directive rights and no further conditions can be imposed by 
the Member States (Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform). This, it is argued, creates at least as great a potential for reverse discrimination 
as basing the recognition of same-sex partnerships on the host state system does, yet the EU 
does not seem overly concerned about reverse discrimination in this context. In fact the ECJ 
commented in Metock that ‘if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in 
the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would 
be seriously obstructed’(at paragraph 62).  
Applying a similar argument to the recognition of civil partnerships, it is accepted that there 
is a potential for reverse discrimination and that, rather than providing rights for those who 
currently to not enjoy recognition of their relationships in any formal way, the rights of those 
already enjoying such protection are (rightly) strengthened. However, the central issue in this 
context is not reverse discrimination but the elimination of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation across the EU. Having decided that sexual orientation is one of the 
protected characteristics in relation to equality law, the EU, it is argued, should be reducing 
the discriminatory reach of Member States. In addition, compelling Member States to 
recognise civil partnership entered into in other Member States would increase the pressure to 
offer such unions to their own nationals and would also send a clear message that sexuality 
discrimination is not tolerated within the EU. 
The definitions as they stand are problematic in more than a theoretical context. Restricting 
the term spouse to heterosexual married couples places same-sex spouses in a legal limbo as 
far as family rights in EU law are concerned. As they are not recognised as spouses in EU 
law but are also not really civil partners as defined in the CRD, they do not fall into any 
category of family member recognised by the Directive. It seems nonsensical that those who 
have chosen to marry and are, in a national context, placed on an equal legal footing with 
heterosexual married couples are not protected in EU law should they chose to migrate to 
another Member State. Their rights might be protected if the chosen host state recognises the 
union or if it can be argued that for the purposes of the CRD the marriage is actually a civil 
partnership recognised as equivalent to marriage.  However, including same-sex married 
couples in the definition of civil partnerships seems to distort that particular definition rather 
more than including same-sex married couples in the definition of spouse. It is therefore hard 
to see how this is anything other than discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
Discrimination which, it is argued cannot be justified because it denies important rights to 
some couples purely on the basis of their sexual orientation. The same argument can be 
applied to the denial of rights to those in civil partnerships if the civil partnership is not 
recognised in the chosen host state. 
 
Article 3 family members enjoy more limited rights which seem to apply to entry and 
residence only. The CRD notes that host Member States should ‘in accordance with [their] 
national legislation, facilitate entry and residence’ of partners (Article 3(2)). It is questionable 
whether affording more limited rights to partners as compared to spouses or civil partners still 
makes sense. Research suggests that the notion of family is changing and that many more 
couples are choosing not to marry or register their partnership (Williams 2004). These 
couples should, it is argued have access to the same rights under the CRD as their married or 
registered counterparts. If this is not the case, a significant proportion of EU citizens may not 
be able to move to another Member State without risking not being able to take their third 
country national partners with them or putting them into a situation where those partners may 
not be able to work or access other rights in the host state. EU law clearly remains biased in 
favour of heterosexual married couples (McGlynn 2007). 
 
Tension with anti-discrimination law and policy 
The EU’s reluctance to recognise same-sex relationships as equivalent to heterosexual ones 
sits uneasily with EU policy in other areas. Article 10 TFEU states that the EU shall ‘aim to 
combat discrimination based on ... sexual orientation’ in implementing its policies and 
activities. Article 19TFEU gives the EU institutions further powers to enact legislation to take 
action to combat discrimination and indeed it has done so. Directive 2000/78 provides for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation. This so called Framework Directive notes in 
recital 11 that:   
 Discrimination based on [ ... ] sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of the 
objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and 
social protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons.  
It seems therefore that some of the arguments previously rejected by the ECJ as discussed 
above are actually acknowledged as valid in the recital to the Framework Directive. In 
addition the Commission has further recognised that protection from discrimination should be 
extended beyond the employment sector. In 2008 it proposed a new Directive to combat 
discrimination on a number of grounds including sexual orientation (European Commission 
2008). This proposal is still under consideration and was last considered in December 2010 
where it was noted that further work and consultation was required before it could be enacted 
(European Council 2010). Clearly however, the EU is committed to combating discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation in a number of areas. Why then is it so reluctant to afford 
same-sex partners recognition on the same basis as straight couples?  It seems that the EU has 
no coherent strategy for eliminating discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
generally. Instead it is sending mixed messages about the value of same-sex unions whether 
formalised or not. This is unacceptable from the perspective of those affected but also 
problematic for EU law more broadly. If EU law lacks coherence in this area, it is difficult to 
take any of the policies in relation to equality all that seriously. It is difficult to believe the EU 
rhetoric of equality and combating discrimination when the EU itself is not applying the 
principle of equal treatment in its own law making.  The symbolic impact and damage to the 
EU’s equality agenda are potentially significant and the answer to the question posed in the 
title of this paper seems to depend on whether it is considered in a migration policy or in an 
equality policy context. 
 
The Symbolic Importance 
In addition to the issues around consistency of EU policy in relation to non discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation outlined above, setting definitions which do not 
discriminate or have the potential to be interpreted in such a way as to discriminate is 
important symbolically. As Deech (2010) shows, Justice Albie Sachs in the South African 
Constitutional Court judgement of Home Affairs v Fourie (at paragraph 71) sets out with 
clarity why discrimination should not be allowed: 
'The exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage, 
accordingly, is not a small and tangential inconvenience resulting from a few surviving 
relics of societal prejudice destined to evaporate like the morning dew. It represents a harsh 
if oblique statement by the law that same-sex couples are outsiders, and that their need for 
affirmation and protection of their intimate relations as human beings is somehow less than 
that of heterosexual couples. It reinforces the wounding notion that they are to be treated as 
biological oddities, as failed or lapsed human beings who do not fit into normal society, 
and, as such, do not qualify for the full moral concern and respect that our Constitution 
seeks to secure for everyone. It signifies that their capacity for love, commitment and 
accepting responsibility is by definition less worthy of regard than that of heterosexual 
couples’. 
 
Although Albie Sach was writing in the context of denying same-sex couples the right to 
marriage where no other possibility for legal recognition of such relationships existed, similar 
argument s can be applied to the way same-sex couples are not afforded the same recognition 
across the EU or indeed in EU law as their heterosexual counterparts. The idea that the term 
‘spouse’ applies only to heterosexual married couples is obviously discriminatory and sends 
much of the same messages Justice Sachs criticises. The fact that EU law has so far stopped 
short of forcing host Member States to accept civil partnerships entered into in home Member 
State is difficult to reconcile with the principle of equal treatment which is otherwise seen as 
so important in Commission rhetoric.  Should the EU not be at the forefront of trying to 
eliminate attitudes which are discriminatory? Furthermore, the position of unmarried and 
unregistered partners, whether same-sex or heterosexual, has perhaps not been examined 
carefully enough to ensure that families are not unnecessarily kept apart.  Symbolically the 
EU could have sent a clear message that same-sex relationships are valued as much as 
heterosexual ones and it could have shown that it really does want to encourage the unity of 
the family in the broader sense. Instead it continues to allow Member States to discriminate 
on the grounds of sexual orientation and, arguably, on outdated notions of family.
iv
 While 
Member State interests and traditions do need to be balanced, cases such as Kozak v. Poland 
or Schalk and Kopf v. Austria perhaps indicate, the societal attitudes referred to by the ECJ in 
Reed, in D and Sweden as well as in relation to the enactment of the CRD have surely now 
shifted sufficiently to warrant a re-think in this area (European Agency of Fundamental 
Rights 2010).
v
 
Conclusion 
This paper has considered the conceptualisation of family in EU free movement law with 
particular reference to partners. It has argued that the EU takes a heterocentric approach to 
defining family which places heterosexual marriage at the centre; affording such couples the 
most generous free movement rights. It has been argued that the exclusion of same sex 
married partners from the term ‘spouse’ is direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation which is not justifiable given the EU’s prohibition of such discrimination in other 
areas. While civil partners enjoy some of the same rights, their enjoyment of EU citizenship 
provisions is limited because it is based on host state recognition of their partnership. 
Furthermore, the treatment of partners who are neither married nor in a civil partnership calls 
into question whether  EU law in this area reflects the changing nature of families. It also 
gives rise to potential indirect discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Overall, it 
is argued that further research is required to fully understand the impact of EU law on same-
sex couples exercising free movement rights and that it is time that the EU reconsidered its 
approach to bring it in line with its emphasis on non discrimination in other areas of law. 
Ultimately, who is an EU citizen’s spouse or partner should not depend on where in the EU 
they happen to find themselves. 
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i 
The rights of children or indeed the rights which can be derived from children’s status as EU citizens will not 
be considered further here. Readers interested in this area may like to read the following as an example of 
commentary on recent case law in this area: Starup, P. And Elsmore, M. (2010). ‘Taking a Logical or Giant Step 
Forward? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira’. ELR 2010 (4) p 571-588 
ii
 The report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2010) gives a useful overview of the rights 
available to same-sex couples in each of the Member States. The 5 recognising same-sex marriage are Sweden, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. However, although legislation along the same lines seems likely 
in some Member States (see O’Brien 2010, Wagner 2010), there are also signs that others are standing firmly 
against same-sex marriage. See for example Paladini (2010) or the recent French decision reported by the BBC 
(2001) and the recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Schalk and Kopf which was 
commented on by Buyse (2010) . 
iii
  The 13 member States recognising Civil Partnerships are Austria Czech Republic Denmark Finland France 
Germany Hungary Ireland Liechtenstein Luxembourg Slovenia United Kingdom 
iv
 There has been much research over recent years which considers the changing notion of family. A useful 
starting place for interested readers is the website of the Care, Values and Future of Welfare website at 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/cava/ or Williams 2004. 
v
 In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights has a much more important legal status following the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as it now has the same status as the Treaties. While a detailed consideration of 
the implications are beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth considering whether the change in status 
requires the EU to place greater emphasis on the rights contained within the Charter. Furthermore the 
accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, currently being negotiated, may bring up 
further questions in this area in the future. 
